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A woman comes to state court with a tribal custodyorder, seeking to modify its provisions. The stateremoves a child from her home and her mother is a
tribal citizen. A couple seeks a divorce in state court but both
are tribal citizens. When these cases appear in state courts,
practitioners need to know how and where family law and
Indian law intersect, and how that intersection shifts the cases
out of the majority of family law cases in state courts. Because
family law is such a large portion of the civil docket, it is easy
for certain procedures to become routine. However, some
cases involving tribal citizens require the application of differ-
ent laws and different standards which are hardly routine. The
intersection of family law and Indian law may account for a
small number of cases, but particularly in states with high
Native populations it is necessary for all state court practi-
tioners to have a basic understanding of the issues involved.
The appearance of a tribal citizen or tribal court order in
state court may cause confusion for state court judges and
practitioners. Judges and lawyers may try to handle the case
under the state family laws with which they are already famil-
iar. However, there are specific federal and state laws which
govern many of these situations. On the federal level, the most
important is the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).1 ICWA
requires certain minimum federal standards be met when an
Indian child is in state court. However, courts are also grap-
pling with the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),2 and the
Adoption and Safe Families Act (AFSA). 3 In addition, state
laws can provide more than the federal minimum standards
provided by ICWA and also affect cases when ICWA does not
apply. Specifically, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)4 as adopted by the state, and var-
ious full faith and credit rules and interpretations, address
tribal courts and tribal court orders when in state court.  
THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
Of the federal laws which come into play in state courts, by
far the most important is the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA). ICWA is the law governing cases involving the
removal of Indian children from their homes and tribes. Passed
in 1978, ICWA governs the removal of an “Indian child” from
the home, the termination of parental rights, and pre-adoption
and adoption placement procedures.5 The goal of ICWA is to
preserve Indian families and keep children connected to their
tribe against an onslaught of state agency attempts to break up
these families and place the children with non-Indian families.
For example, from 1971 to 1972, Indian children were adopted
at eight times the rate of non-Indian children, and virtually all
of these children were placed in non-Indian homes.6 Because
the very existence of a tribe is in its children, this taking of
children strikes at the heart of tribes and their existence.7
Understanding ICWA’s dual goals – to protect both the child
and the tribe – is the first step in understanding the various
provisions of the law.
ICWA changes the rules of traditional family law practice by
requiring different, and higher, standards based on a child’s
tribal status. Though ICWA singles out a specific group for dif-
ferent treatment, such as higher standards of proof for termi-
nating parental rights, or requiring more effort by the state in
maintaining family ties, this federal law is not unconstitutional.
The group ICWA seeks to protect are tribal citizens and their
nations. ICWA is based on the government-to-government rela-
tionship between the federal government and Indian nations,
and the political status of tribal citizens as citizens of their
nations.8 The federal government has long recognized a “trust
relationship” with tribes, based on treaties, statutes and court
cases. Some also trace the relationship to the Commerce Clause
and Treaty Clause of the Constitution. As stated in the
Handbook of Federal Indian Law, “[t]he commerce clause has
become the linchpin in the more general power over Indian
affairs recognized by Congress and the courts.”9 The Commerce
Clause, therefore, “anticipat[es] and affirm[s] federal law
singl[ing] out Indian nations and their members for separate
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treatment.”10 The Supreme Court also provides a basis for the
trust relationship in various decisions as early as 1831.11
The trust relationship now covers a broad range of federal
legislation designed to provide services and benefits to tribes
and tribal citizens, and is often cited by Congress when pass-
ing legislation designed for tribes or tribal citizens. In ICWA,
Congress started the findings section by “recognizing the spe-
cial relationship between the United States and the Indian
tribes and their members and the Federal responsibility to
Indian people....”12 Because of this special relationship, the
Supreme Court has held that Congress has the power to “leg-
islate on behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes.”13 This
singling out is also based on tribal citizens’ own political rela-
tionship as citizens of their tribes.14 As citizens, or potential
citizens, of a tribe, a child is due both the benefits and respon-
sibilities as a tribal citizen and the benefits of the federal trust
relationship. In removing a child from a tribe, not only does a
tribe lose one of its citizens, the child loses her tribe.
For these reasons, ICWA is a particularly important statute.
However, while ICWA itself is not long or complex, state inter-
pretations of it are wide ranging. Most importantly, ICWA
slows down the usual practices regarding the removal and
placement of Indian children outside of their homes and their
tribes. This is because of the abuse, or complete lack, of due
process procedures when children were systematically
removed from parents by the state.15 Indeed, even with the
implementation of ICWA, certain due process procedures
required by the statute are still systematically not followed.16
While the only Supreme Court case interpreting the statute,
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield17 strongly
encouraged uniform state application of the law, stating “a
statute under which different rules apply from time to time to
the same child, simply as a result of his or her transport from
one State to another, cannot be what Congress had in mind,”18
interpretations of the provisions of ICWA do vary widely from
state to state. In addition, ICWA provides for the “minimum
federal standards” for protection of Indian children in state
court. Some states have passed laws with higher standards for
Indian children in their state courts. Regardless, the federal
provisions of ICWA require state courts to follow certain pro-
cedures in ICWA cases.   
ICWA applies to specific “child custody proceedings.”
These proceedings are usually non-voluntary, such as foster
care or guardianship placement where the child “cannot be
returned upon demand” of the parent, or permanent, such as
termination of parental rights, pre-adoption and adoption
placement procedures.19 For example, while deciding to allow
a child to be adopted may
be a voluntary act by the
parent, it is a permanent
severance of the child from
the parent, and likely the
tribe, and therefore falls
under the ICWA. ICWA
does not apply in custody
disputes stemming from
divorce cases. However, as
discussed below, laws other
than ICWA or state divorce
laws may govern in those
cases.
For ICWA to apply in these situations, the child must be
considered an “Indian child.” The state agency bringing the
action falling under ICWA has the affirmative duty to deter-
mine whether the child might be a tribal member or eligible for
tribal citizenship and a biological child of a tribal citizen. Since
only the tribe has the ability to determine whether the child
would be considered an Indian child under the act, the tribe
must be contacted by the state in these proceedings. While the
court does not have the ability to determine the child’s status
as an Indian child, it does have a role in determining whether
the tribe qualifies under ICWA, specifically, whether the tribe
is federally recognized.  
While the court must determine if the child is potentially an
“Indian child,” it is not, nor is it ever, the state court’s role to
determine if the child is eligible for tribal membership. That is
a decision of the tribe, and implicates a key area of tribal sov-
ereignty. The Supreme Court, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
stated “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal
purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as
an independent political community.”20 Most states around the
country have upheld this fundamental provision of tribal sov-
ereignty.21
In conjunction with determining if ICWA applies to the case,
the state also must comply with the notice provision. The state
is required to notify the tribe, the parent, the “Indian custo-
dian” and the regional BIA office of the proceedings as soon as
the state has any knowledge the case might fall under ICWA.
The agency making the petition has the duty to make the noti-
fication and make it properly. Lack of notice at the start of a case
can be an incurable flaw later in the case. For example, the
Michigan Appeals Court has held that “failure to comply with
the requirements of the ICWA may render invalid a proceeding
terminating a parent’s rights.”22 California routinely remands
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ICWA cases for noncompliance
with the notice provisions of
the statute.23 Without notice,
the tribe is unable to exercise
its right of intervention and
petition for transfer. Improper
notice means ICWA cannot be
applied to the rest of the pro-
ceeding, since the tribe may
have no way of knowing the
case even exists. This notice is
of particular importance given
the jurisdictional aspects of
ICWA. Finally, notifying and communicating with the tribe is
one way a state court may determine whether the child is con-
sidered an Indian child by the tribe. 
Initially ICWA shifts jurisdiction slightly from the usual
civil tribal jurisdiction interpretation. In an ICWA case, if the
Indian child resides off of the reservation, the state and tribe
have concurrent jurisdiction. If the child resides on the reser-
vation the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction. These cases are not
evaluated under principles of civil tribal jurisdiction; ICWA
clearly provides for the jurisdictional boundaries in these
cases. If the state is exercising its concurrent jurisdiction, the
tribe, or Indian custodian, has the right to intervene in the
case. The tribe also has the right to petition for transfer of the
case to tribal court. Absent “good cause to the contrary” the
state court “shall” transfer the case to the tribal court.24
ICWA is a highly litigated statute, and both the intervention
and transfer provisions have been the subject of cases in state
court. “Good cause” is a difficult standard to quantify, and each
state has determined for itself what “good cause” may be. One
area of guidance is the Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines for
State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings.25 The Guidelines
are not binding on state courts, though many states find them
persuasive. While the Guidelines provide different factors
involved to determine “good cause,” including the timeliness of
the petition for transfer, the best interests of the child standard
is not to be considered by the court. Because the best interest
standard is used by most family law courts, there have been
some cases where courts have incorrectly applied the best inter-
ests standard to this jurisdictional standard. In South Dakota,
the supreme court overturned a decision by the trial court to
deny a transfer to tribal court based on an evaluation of the best
interests of the child. The court held “that a substitute parent
might provide a child with good care or even better care than
its natural parent is not an appropriate standard for determin-
ing the best interests of the child in the context of a ICWA
transfer decision.”26 As an appellate court in Illinois pointed
out, the best interests test was “relevant not to determine juris-
diction but to ascertain placement.”27
If the tribe does not seek to transfer the case to tribal court,
or if the state fails to transfer the case because of good cause,
the state is still bound by ICWA and required to follow its pro-
visions. Among others, these include the placement provisions
and active efforts provision. When a child is removed from her
family and placed in foster care or with an adoptive family, the
court must place the child in accordance with the ICWA’s place-
ment preferences. Importantly, the court first must determine if
the tribe has passed a law regarding placement preferences, as
these are to be the primary guidance for a state court to follow.
Otherwise, children in foster care must be placed in the “least
restrictive setting” in “reasonable proximity to his or her home”
and placed with either a member of the child’s extended family,
a foster home approved or licensed by the tribe, an Indian fos-
ter home licensed by the state, or an institution run by an
Indian organization or approved by the tribe. Children being
adopted must be placed with a member of the child’s family,
members of the child’s tribe, or another Indian family. 28
There is, however, a “good cause,” exception to the ICWA
placement preferences as well, and some state courts have
inserted the best interests test into this determination as well.
For a court to deviate from the placement preferences, it must
provide “good cause to the contrary.”29 Again, the BIA
Guidelines provide some guidance as to what “good cause”
might consist of, but specifically does not list a best interests
standard as good cause. ICWA assumes the best interests of the
Indian child are served by following the placement prefer-
ences. Using the best interests standard of the state court to
undermine the placement preferences ignores Congressional
intent and fails to acknowledge the reasons ICWA had to be
passed in the first place. The best interests test is amorphous,
and allows the court to insert the very standards and values
ICWA tries to counter.
Another vital provision in the act is the active efforts sec-
tion. The phrase “active efforts” refers to the portion of the law
which requires that in the event of foster care placement or ter-
mination of parental rights, the party seeking to remove the
child must demonstrate that “active efforts have been made to
provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed
to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these
efforts have proved unsuccessful.”30 Unfortunately, the statute
does not define what these active efforts need to be, and are
often the subject of litigation. The BIA Guidelines do provide
some instruction, stating that the efforts should “take into
account the prevailing social and cultural conditions and way
of life of the Indian child’s tribe. They shall also involve and
use the available resources of the extended family, the tribe,
Indian social service agencies and individual Indian care
givers.”31 At the very least, active efforts require more than pas-
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sive efforts, and also must include tribal services and culturally
appropriate services.32
Because of the relatively amorphous definition, there are
not many cases listing what satisfies the active efforts require-
ment. Rather, the courts tend to focus on the facts of each indi-
vidual case to determine whether active efforts occurred. A
majority of state courts have found active efforts require more
than the normal services offered to non-Indian parents.33 In
South Dakota, the Supreme Court followed the Holyfield
directive for the statute to be applied uniformly across the
country and determined that active efforts did require more
than the regular services offered by the state.34
More recently, courts have been struggling with the inter-
play between ICWA and AFSA. However, AFSA and ICWA
have contradictory goals, and ought not to be read together.
Generally the biggest conflict comes under ICWA’s require-
ment of active efforts to rehabilitate and reunite the Indian
family separated by the court. Under AFSA, in certain circum-
stances, reasonable efforts are not required by the court before
terminating parental rights. Indeed, the goals of AFSA, to
hurry up adoption proceedings and streamline the process, are
the opposite of ICWA, which is to slow down the parental ter-
mination process and make sure proper procedures are fol-
lowed before the permanent removal of Indian children from
their families. Where ICWA applies, AFSA should not.35
Even after the application of active efforts, there are differ-
ent standards of proof in non-ICWA and ICWA cases. Under
ICWA, removal of an Indian child from the home requires clear
and convincing evidence, and testimony by qualified experts,
that leaving the child in the home will lead to “serious emo-
tional or physical damage to the child.” Under ICWA, termi-
nation of parental rights requires evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, and testimony by qualified experts, that the child will
suffer “serious emotional or physical damage.”36 Different
states have applied these standards in various ways. For exam-
ple, in Michigan, both the federal and state levels of evidence
must be met. Therefore, to terminate the parental rights of a
parent to an Indian child, the court must prove the ICWA stan-
dard, and also “find clear and convincing evidence that one or
more enumerated statutory grounds for termination exist.”37
ICWA also provides rules for the enforcement of any tribal
court orders a state court might encounter in an ICWA case.
Under ICWA, tribal court judgments are to be enforced by the
state court without any question into the nature of the tribal
court or previous tribal court proceedings. In other words, in
ICWA cases, tribal court orders, tribal laws and judicial pro-
ceedings are granted full faith and credit by the state courts.38
Finally, some courts have
used the judicially created
existing Indian family
exception to avoid applying
ICWA at all. Courts created
the existing Indian family
exception for children and
families the court determines should have no contact with the
tribe. In other words, the court puts itself in the position of
determining the “Indian-ness” of a child, and ignores the fed-
eral requirements of ICWA’s Indian child definition. Many
states have rejected this exception, and – notably – it was also
recently rejected in Kansas, the state to first introduce the
exception.39 States which have also rejected the existing Indian
family exceptioninclude Michigan, New York, Illinois and
Alaska, among many others.40
STATE LAWS, COURT RULES, AND ICWA
Some states have adopted ICWA as either a state law or court
rule. These laws or rules may be different than the federal
statute. As Congress wrote, ICWA is considered the “federal
minimum standards” governing cases involving Indian chil-
dren. Some states have chosen to go beyond those minimum
standards, while some adopt the law with no changes. Under
ICWA, when a state or federal law provides a “higher standard
of protection” for the parents or Indian custodian of an Indian
child, the state or federal law applies.41 However, state courts
react to these laws and rules in different ways. One issue with
state law adaption of ICWA is the state court’s ability to review,
and determine the state constitutionality of, these laws. 
In Iowa, the state legislature adopted ICWA as state law,
with some changes to various parts of the federal statute. The
Iowa ICWA statute extended the definition of Indian child to
include children recognized as members of the tribal commu-
nity.42 Recently the Iowa Supreme Court found that portion of
the ICWA statute unconstitutional. Citing the U.S. Supreme
Court’s holding in Morton v. Mancari, the Iowa Court deter-
mined that the state definition impermissibly included
“racially” Indian children, not just children who are tribal 
citizens or eligible for tribal citizenship.43
After a series of cases in the California appellate courts, the
California legislature passed a law banning the courts from
using the existing Indian family doctrine to prevent the appli-
cation of ICWA.44 At least one appellate court found that
statute to be unconstitutional and applied the existing Indian
family doctrine.45 However, the legislature passed the law
again, now as Welfare and Institutions Code §224, and a 2007
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appellate court case upheld the
law as constitutional.46 There
is still a split, however, in the
California appellate courts
regarding the application of
the existing Indian family
exception.
In Michigan, the
Department of Human
Services of course must follow
the notice requirements of
ICWA.47 The Michigan Appeals Court agreed with a Vermont
Supreme Court case that “it is preferable to err on the side of
giving notice and examining thoroughly whether the juvenile
is an Indian child.”48 However, Michigan also provides for
more extensive notice proceedings than the ICWA notice pro-
visions. Michigan’s court rule on ICWA requires a court to
inquire about the child or parent’s status as a tribal citizen. The
appellate court cited to ICWA and stated that “Michigan
imposes a more stringent standard than that found in §1912(a)
of the ICWA to ensure that inquiry and notification are per-
formed.”49
In another case, though, the Michigan appeals court main-
tained ICWA’s narrow definition of an Indian child, holding
that ICWA does not apply when the “minor child is claimed to
be an Indian child from an Indian tribe that is not recognized
as eligible for services provided to Indians by the Secretary of
the Interior,”50 contrary to the state’s own Children’s Foster Care
Manual, which encouraged the courts to extend ICWA to state-
recognized or Canadian tribes. The tribe in question in the
case was neither a non-federally recognized tribe located in
Michigan nor a Canadian First Nation. Whether the Michigan
court would consider those under Michigan ICWA standards is
questionable.
Finally, Wisconsin has also found that when trying to “har-
monize” its children’s code and ICWA, the state law may be
invoked when it provides higher standards of protection.
Specifically, the court stated when the state law “provides a
higher standard of protection than is mandated by the ICWA,
we find it appropriate that where the children’s code provides
additional safeguards beyond what is mandated by ICWA,
those additional safeguards should be followed.”51
At this time at least two states, Michigan and North
Carolina, are contemplating incorporating ICWA into state
statutes to both clarify and potentially extend ICWA’s federal
minimum protections.52
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IN NON-ICWA FAMILY LAW
CASES
There are family law cases where ICWA does not apply, but
other state and federal laws may. Generally, the treatment of
tribal court orders in family law cases is governed by both state
and federal law. Part of the issue comes down to distinguishing
between full faith and credit, comity and various state court
rules regarding comity or full faith and credit. 
Full faith and credit is guaranteed in Art. IV of the United
States Constitution, to ensure the sister states give full force to
the judicial proceedings in other states. When faced with an
order from another state, the implementation and enforcement
of it ought to be automatic. There are no discussions of due
process standards or reading behind the order itself. A federal
statute, 28 USC §1738, expanded the full faith and credit
clause to territories and possessions of the United States. The
statute does not explicitly include tribes. However, two states
– Idaho and New Mexico – interpret the statute to include
tribes.53 These states conclude the tribes are equivalent territo-
ries, and therefore grant full faith and credit to tribal court
judgments. The vast majority of states do not interpret that
statute or the Constitution to ensure full faith and credit for
Indian tribes. However, other federal statutes such as the
Violence Against Women Act and the Child Support Order Act
include full faith and credit for tribal court order provisions.
When these statutes apply, the state court does not invoke a
state statute, rule or comity when enforcing the judgment.
Enforcement of the judgment is automatic under these federal
statutes.
When faced with a foreign court order, a state or federal
court will invoke principles of “comity.”  Comity is a far more
amorphous concept, based on the respect of another sovereign.
The Supreme Court, in Hilton v. Guyot,54 stated that comity was
“neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor
of mere courtesy and good will upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,” which
it has cited approvingly in later cases.55 Enforcing a foreign
court order is not guaranteed or required. Comity requires a
discussion of a number of factors, including due process con-
cerns and public policy issues. Indeed, it has been noted that
the use of comity may even bring up concerns of separation of
powers and political question issues, as only Congress and the
Executive Branch have the power to deal with foreign nations.
The granting, or not granting, of comity to a foreign court may
have the potential to cause larger foreign policy problems.56
A majority of states, when enforcing tribal court judgments
not governed by federally mandated full faith and credit laws
still use principles of comity to determine the enforcement of
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2007).
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the judgment. Some states, however, have passed a statute or
court rule to provide guidance for state courts when enforcing
a tribal court judgment. In Michigan, a unique court rule gov-
erns the enforcement of tribal court judgments when there is
no other state or federal law dictating otherwise. M.C.R. 2.615
is not quite full faith and credit, but is a higher standard than
comity, and is a reciprocal rule. In order for a tribe to have its
orders enforced in a Michigan state court, it must pass a law or
rule ensuring its tribal courts enforce state court judgments.
The tribe must notify the State Court Administrative Office
(SCAO) of their rule. The SCAO maintains a list of which
tribes qualify under M.C.R. 2.615. In addition, M.C.R. 2.615
does not limit reciprocity to tribes located in Michigan. Any
federally recognized tribe can file with the SCAO, provided the
tribe has passed the rule regarding the enforcement of
Michigan state court judgments in their court.
Under M.C.R. 2.615, a tribal court judgment is presumed
valid. The party challenging the order must prove otherwise.
This is a distinct difference from comity, where the burden of
proof is on the party seeking to enforce the foreign order.
Therefore, a tribal court judgment is presumed valid by the
court unless challenged, and when challenged, that party must
demonstrate one of five factors applies to the order. Four of the
factors are types of evaluations the state courts do in other
comity cases, including whether the order was obtained
through fraud or duress, without notice or hearing, “repug-
nant” to public policy, or not final. The fifth factor, however, is
a lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, a determina-
tion which requires an understanding of civil tribal jurisdiction.  
Regardless of state court rules, in all cases, a court must
determine whether the tribe had jurisdiction over the case
under which the order arises. Civil tribal jurisdiction requires
a complex analysis and complete understanding of the parties’
tribal citizenship and residence.57 As a sovereign entity, a tribe
has inherent jurisdiction over its own citizens residing on the
reservation. If the tribal citizens are not domiciled on the reser-
vation, the state and tribe may have concurrent jurisdiction,
depending on the tribe’s code. In some instances, the tribe has
jurisdiction over non-Indians as well. If a dispute occurs
between a tribal citizen and a non-Indian on the reservation,
the tribe may have jurisdiction, but if the same dispute arises
off the reservation, the state has jurisdiction. Of course, a non-
Indian can consent to tribal jurisdiction, and in some cases the
tribal code extends jurisdiction to non-Indians living on the
reservation.  
One additional issue regarding full faith and credit impli-
cates the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).58 Many states have adopted this
model statute as state law. In the draft published by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, tribes were included in section 102 and 104. Specifically,
the draft law stated that if ICWA applies to a case, the UCCJEA
does not. However, the draft law also requires states to treat
tribes as if they are sister states for the purposes of applying the
law, and also states that tribal determination of child custody
must be “recognized and enforced.”59 If the tribal court had
proper jurisdiction over the custody proceeding, then the state
cannot later exercise jurisdiction other than to enforce the cus-
tody order. While some states may not have chosen to add the
additional language when they codified the UCCJEA as state
law, some have. Since the UCCJEA is used every day by family
court practitioners, treating tribes as states does not require a
difficult analysis. The same rules apply to a tribal court order
as to a state court order. 
CONCLUSION
The interplay of these laws can be confusing, particularly if
the practitioner is not familiar with their language or applica-
tion. Family law cases are already emotionally difficult, with
multiple parties trying to achieve what they believe will be the
best conclusion for a child. When the family court routine
shifts with the introduction of different laws, confusion and
miscommunication is not uncommon. An understanding of
these laws and why they apply makes it easier for all involved
parties. However, ignoring ICWA or misapplying ICWA early
on only leads to extended litigation. The court’s adherence to
the federal law can ensure the relatively quick resolution of dif-
ficult cases. 
Many tribes now have fully functioning tribal courts at both
the trial and appellate level. Both highly educated tribal citi-
zens and traditional tribal elders sit as judges and justices on
these courts. Acknowledging and respecting the work these
tribal courts do on a daily basis is a first step for any state court
judge when faced with a tribal court order or a motion to trans-
fer a case to tribal court. Cooperation and communication
between tribal and state courts make difficult cases easier and
lead to better resolutions for those involved.
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